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INTRODUCTION
To any one interested in the comparative study of legal
decisions, it is intensely intriguing to take a statute which has been
passed in substantially similar form in several jurisdictions, and
compare the interpretations put upon it by different groups of
judges, each group supreme within its own jurisdiction. The
question becomes doubly interesting where these judges put dif-
ferent interpretations upon the same language. Such a situation
is presented by the construction placed by the federal courts and
by most of the state courts, so far as decisions have been made, on
similar language in the Federal Tax Act and in the Transfer
Inheritance Tax Acts of some of the states, regarding the taxation
of certain kinds of trust estates created by deed during the settlor's
lifetime. This article is concerned primarily with these differ-
ences in interpretation in the state of Pennsylvania, with the
addition of certain typical illustrative decisions in some of the
other states that have been rendered in the last ten years.
The Federal Revenue Act of September 8, I916,' provided
for the taxation of any trust estate created at any time before the
settlor's death, where it was "intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after his death". This phraseology was not
original with the Congress of I9i6--it had been used in Pennsyl-
vania as early as the Act of April 7, 1826, Section 1,2 passed over
ninety years previously.
The success of the Federal Government as a tax collector
from the estates of decedents during the war and in the years
immediately following it led the legislatures of various states to
recast their own inheritance tax statutes, and to enact new ones
embodying at least some of the phraseology that was new in the
'39 STA. 756 (I916).
- LAvs OF PENNA., 1825-1826, c. LXXII.
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Federal Act. This was the case in Pennsylvania, where an Inher-
itance Tax Act was adopted in i9 19 . This generally codified,
redefined and enlarged the scope of the earlier acts and also pro-
vided for a direct inheritance transfer tax, retaining, with the
addition of the word 'gift' this same language of the earlier act as
to transfers "by deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift . . . intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after . . . death".
The differences in interpretation we are here considering
result in the divergent tests of taxability adopted by the state and
federal courts, the former placing emphasis on the parties entitled
to the income, the latter on the revocability of such trusts. With
these two aspects in view four possible combinations of facts pre-
sent themselves, omitting all transfers made in contemplation of
death:
A. The settlor reserving the right to revoke and also all or
most of the income to himself for life.
B. The settlor reserving a general right to revoke but with
the income payable to others during their lives.
C. The trust irrevocable and the settlor reserving all the
income for life.
D. The trust irrevocable with the income payable to others
for their lives.
Each of these four may also have annexed to it a power of
appointment as to the remainder, and this remainder interest may,
under certain contingencies in irrevocable trusts, revert back to the
settlor's own estate.
A. THE SETTLOR RESERVING THE RIGHT TO RiEVOKE, AND ALSO
ALL OR MOST OF THE INCOME TO HIMSELF FOR LIFE
Here the great weight of state and federal authority holds
the trust estate taxable at the death of the settlor as part of his own
estate. For Pennsylvania, Lines' Estate 4 and the more recent
application of the principle in Hartley's Estate 5 may be cited.
8Act of June 2D, 1919, P. L. 521.
' 155 Pa. 378, 26 At. 728 (1893).
'8 D. & C. 164 (Pa. 1926).
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Representative cases similar to these can also be found in Illinois,'
Massachusetts,7 Nebraska, s Nevada,9 New York,'0 North Caro-
lina," Vermont,' 2 Oregon and Wisconsin; 13 a typical federal
case is United States v. Stark.'4  Of course, a reservation of
power to appoint the principal makes the argument for taxation
even stronger; this was laid down nearly seventy years ago in
Pennsylvania 15 and is illustrated by a recent case in California.' 6
The United States Supreme Court, in Bullen v. Wisconsin,
17
decided that a power of appointment reserved by the donor leaves
the transfer, as to him, incomplete and subject to tax. And as
general powers of appointment are specifically taxed by the fed-
eral statutes, no decisions as to the federal tax on them are needed
here. To this general rule of taxability, Connecticut 1I and pos-
sibly Maryland '" seem outstanding exceptions.
B. THE SETTLOR RESERVING A GENERAL RIGHT TO REVOKE BUT
WITH THE INCOME PAYABLE TO OTHERS DURING THEIR
LIVES
The leading state case on this seems to be Dolan's Estate,
20
decided in 1924 by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Here a
settlor had executed a deed of trust in 19o8, transferring certain
'People v. McCormick, 327 Ill. 547, x58 N. E. 861 (1927).
7 Saltonstall v. Treasurer, et aL., 256 Mass. 519, 153 N. E. 4 (1926) ; aff'd
by the U. S. Supreme Ct. in 276 U. S. 26o, 271, 48 Sup. Ct 225, 227 (1928).
'Bronzynski's Est, 116 Neb. 196, 216 N. W. 558 (1927).
'Miller's Est., 43 Nev. 12, t77 Pac. 409 (i919).
" In re Bostwick, i6o N. Y. 489, 55 N. E. 208 (1899), criticising and limit-
ing Masury's Est., 28 App. Div. 58o, 51 N. Y. Supp. 331, which was affirmed
without opinion in 159 N. Y. 532, 53 N. E. 1127 (i899). Dana Co., 215 N. Y.
461, 1o9 N. E. 557 (915).
"Bank v. Doughton, 188 N. C. 762, 125 S. E. 621 (1924).
"Fulham's Est., 96 Vt. 308, IIq At. 433 (1923).
"Wallace's Est., 131 Ore. 597, 282 Pac. 76o (1929) ; Warsco v. Oshkosh,
183 Wis. 156, 196 N. W. 829 (I924).
1432 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A. 6th, ig29).
"Wright's Appeal, 38 Pa. 5o7 (186T).
Murphy's Est., 182 Cal. 740. igo Pac. 46 (i92o).
"24o U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473 (x916), aff'g 143 Wis. 512, 128 N. W.
lo9 (191o). See also Saltonstall v. Treasurer et aL., supra note 7.
' Cramer v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 1no Conn. 22, 147 Atl. 139
(1929).
'Downes v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 157 Md. 87, 145 AtI. 350 (1921).
The deed here while in form irrevocable, gave the grantor the right to withdraw
$5ooo per annum of the princioal during his lifetime, if desired.
-°279 Pa. 582, 124 AUt. 176 (1924) aff'g 3 D. & C. 264 (Pa. 1923).
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designated securities and any others which she might thereafter
deliver, in trust, to be held for twenty-one years after the death of
the last surviving lineal descendant of the settlor living at the time
of her death, the trustee to pay the income to the settlor's three
male children during their lives, and after their deaths to their
widows during widowhood, then to their issue living at the expi-
ration of the twenty-one-year period above mentioned. Under the
trust, the settlor, or the majority of the beneficiaries, could remove
the trustee at any time, and the settlor had the right to revoke the
trust in its entirety at any time during her life, or from time to
time to alter or amend it.
Before the settlor died the Direct Inheritance Tax Act 21 had
been enacted, and the life estates of the sons were appraised and
taxed. The Orphans' Court, on appeal from the Register, held
that the property had vested prior to the passage of the Act, which
imposed the tax, and that no tax was due. This decision was
affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In its opinion the
Court stated that a conveyance must part with "possession, title*
and enjoyment in the grantor's lifetime" to escape taxation, 22 and
that when a settlor retained the "grasp" of the entire estate as long
as he lived, it could not be said that possession and enjoyment in
the beneficiaries took effect prior to death; in such a case, the
Commonwealth was entitled to a tax on the transfer. They fur-
ther stated, however, that this case was distinguishable, as the
settlor had divested herself of the physical control of the property
and had given complete and sufficient evidence of the transfer of
all ownership. Her death did not change the character of the
document or remould it from a deed to a will, and the annexation
of a power of revocation did not affect the grantees' power of
enjoyment, although the grantees took the estate with the possi-
bility of its being divested by the exercise of the power of revoca-
tion. The Court said:
"But the right to revoke, unexercised, is a dead thing. Its
presence in a deed does not alter the character of the instru-
ment or estate granted; to all intents and purposes, title and
Supra note 3.
Citing Reish v. Commonwealth, Io6 Pa. 521, 526 (1884).
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possession pass just as effectively as any deed or grant could
make it, continuing in that state so long as the power of revo-
cation lies dormant." 23
A power of revocation unexercised was compared to an unexer-
cised power of appointment.
When the Court decided Dolanis Estate, it had precedents
from two other states to follow, 24 and it also cited its own cases
allowing either husband or wife to set up a trust for himself or
herself with power of revocation, without rendering the deed a
testamentary instrument.2 5  It also relied on some general state-
ments from the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in
Jones v Clifton,2 0 as delivered by Mr. Justice Field in 1879. In
this case Clifton had married in 187o. Two years later he gave
his wife by a recorded deed, to hold as a separate estate, a parcel
of land and five insurance policies on his life, reserving to himself
a power to revoke, grant and assign the same in whole or in part,
and to transfer the property to any uses he might appoint. The
next year he gave his wife under a similar recorded deed two other
parcels of land. At the time these transfers were made he was
worth more than fifty thousand dollars. The panic of 1873 and
his bad management made him an insolvent in 1875, and his
assignee in bankruptcy sued to set aside these two deeds and com-
pel a transfer. It was held that these were voluntary settlements
upon his wife, made when free from debt, and were valid, Justice
Field saying in the opinion:
"The powers of revocation and appointment to other uses
reserved to the husband in the deeds in question do not impair
their validity or their efficiency in transferring the estate to
the wife to be held by her until such revocation or appoint-
ment be made. Indeed such reservations are usual in family
settlements and are intended 'to meet the ever varying inter-
ests of family connections'. Riggs v. Murray, 2 Johns
(N. Y.) Ch. 565 . . the absence of a power of revoca-
'279 Pa. at 589, 124 AtI. at 178.
.' People v. Northern Trust Co., 289 I1. 475, 124 N. E. 66z (192o) ; Masury's
Est., supra note 10.
I Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21 Ati. 8og (i8gi) ; Windolph v. Girard Trust
Co., 245 Pa. 349, 91 At. 634 (1914).
ioi U. S. 225, 23o (1879).
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tion and of appointment to other uses in a deed of family
settlement has often been considered a badge of fraud and
except when made solely to guard against the extravagance
and imprudence of the settlor, such settlements have in many
instances been annulled on that ground."
The Court further remarked that these settlements with such
powers of revocation attached were "of greater importance" in
England than in America.
The test of whether the deeds of trust belong to the first class
and are taxable or to the second class under which they are gen-
erally held non-taxable in the state courts was thus stated in 1923,
by Judge (now Chief Justice) Cardozo of the New York Court
of Appeals:
"The distinction is between a gift which clothes the
donee with a right of present enjoyment, though subject to
revocation at the will of the donor, and one where the donor
reserves to himself not only the power to revoke, but also
enjoyment during life, so that no beneficial right enforcible
against him exists until his death. In the one class of cases,
the law in force at the delivery of the deed, and in the other
the law in force at death, is the measure of the right to tax." 21
The New York decisions stress the word "intend" in the
statute, i. e., the intention existing at the moment the trust was
created:
"What did the donor intend as to the possession, or the
enjoyment of the avails of the gift in the instant case? Did
he intend the gifts to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after death? Did the donees have such possession or
enjoyment from the creation of the trusts ?"
If the donor intended the objects of his bounty (excluding him-
self) to have the enjoyment of the property during his life, it is
obvious that he did not 'intend' to have their enjoyment of his
bounty postponed until his death.
Some of the other states, in addition to New York, which
have construed these words in the same manner as the Pennsyl-
'Matter of Schmidlapp, 236 N. Y. 278, 284, 14o N. E. 697 (1923). See
also Cochrane's Estate, 117 Misc. 18, Igo N. Y. Supp. 895 (I92i), aff'd without
opinion 2o2 App. Div. 751, 194 N. Y. Supp. 924 (1922).
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vania Court in Dolan's Estate, and have thus relieved the estate
transferred from transfer tax, are Illinois 21 and Massachusetts.2"
The federal judges, however, when they came to construe
this same statutory language, i. e., "intended to take effect in pos-
session or enjoyment at or after death", decided that the ability to
get the property back was equivalent to potential enjoyment, even
if this right was not exercised; as the donor had at all times the
right and power to repossess himself, even if he did not do so, it
was potentially his and as such should be taxed under the Federal
Revenue Act. They placed the emphasis on the word 'transfer'.
This conclusion seems to follow from the language of the Court
in two cases handed down the same day-January 8, 1929, al-
though each case, if rested only on its own facts, would not seem
to justify such a broad general rule, so far as the present decisions
of the United States Supreme Court are concerned. These cases
are Chase National Bank v. the United States 30 and Reineke v.
The Trust Cornpanv. 31 The Chase case covered only insurance
policies, which our state statutes and decisions would have ex-
empted from the state tax, but the language of the Court is
important:
... the word 'transfer' . cannot be taken in such
a restricted sense as to refer only to the passing of particular
items of property directly from the decedent to the trans-
feree. . . . Termination of the power of control at the
time of death . . . brings about at death the completion of
that shifting of the economic benefits of property which is
the real subject of the tax, just as effectively as would its
exercise. . . To make a decision between a general power
and a limitation in fee is to grasp at a shadow while the sub-
stance escapes. Sugden on Powers, 8th Ed. 396."
' People v. Northem Trust Co., supra note 24; People v. Northern Trust
Co., 330 Ill. 238, 161 N. E. 525 (1928) (as to two of the four deeds).
Dexter v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 243 Mass. 523, 137 N. E. 877
(1923). See also Bower's Est., 195 App. Div. 548, 186 N. Y. Supp. 912 (1921),
rev'g 183 N. Y. Supp. 37, aff'd without opinion, 231 N. Y. 613 (1921).
Miller's Est., 2o4 App. Div. 418, 198 N. Y. Supp. 202 (1923) as modified in 236
N. Y. 29o, 14o N. E. 701 (1923), and 237 N. Y. 524, 143 N. F 728 (1923);
Cochrane's Est, supra note 27; Carnegie Est., X17 Misc. 8o6, i9i N. Y. Supp.
753 (i92I), aff'd in 236 N. Y. 517, 142 N. E. 266 (1923).
278 U. S. 327, 337, 338, 49 Sup. Ct 126, 128.
'Ibid. at 339, 49 Sup. Ct. at 123.
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In the Reineke case,32 "respondent's testator died May 30,
1922. On various dates between 19o3 and I919 he established
seven trusts by deed which are conceded not to have been in con-
templation of death. Two of them were created respectively in
1903 and 19IO. They are . . . referred to here as the 'two
trusts'. By them the income from the trusts was reserved to the
settlor for life and on his death the income of each trust was to
be paid to a designated person until the termination of the trust as
provided in the trust instrument, with remainders over. By the
terms of each trust there was reserved to the settlor alone a power
of revocation of the trusts, upon the exercise of which the trustee
was required to return the corpus of the trust to him.
"The remaining five trusts, . . . referred to here as the
'five trusts', were created in I919 before the passage of the Rev-
enue Act of 1921, but after the enactment of the similar provisions
of the estate tax of the Revenue Act of I918.33  By each, life
interests in the income, on terms not now important, were created.
In one the life interest was terminable five years after the death of
the settlor or on the death of the designated life beneficiary should
she survive that date, with a remainder over. In the other four,
life interests in the income were created, terminable five years after
the settlor's death or on the death of the respective life tenants,
whichever should first happen, with remainders over. The settlor
reserved to himself power to supervise the reinvestment of trust
funds, to require the trustee to execute proxies to his nominee, to
vote any shares of stock held by the trustee, to control all leases
executed by the trustee, and to appoint successor trustees. With
respect to each of these five trusts a power was also reserved 'to
alter, change or modify the trust,' which was to be exercised in the
case of four of them by the settlor and the single beneficiary of
each trust, acting jointly, and in the case of one of the trusts, by
the settlor and a majority of the beneficiaries named, acting jointly.
"The settlor died without having revoked either of the two
trusts and with the beneficiaries and life tenants designated in the
'The following statement of facts is from the opinion of Mr. Justice
Stone, ibid. at 343, 49 Sup. Ct at 124.
240 STAT. 1096, i097, 26 U. S. C. A. §§ iogi, io92 (1928).
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trusts surviving him, and without having modified any of the five
trusts except one and that in a manner not now material." The
Court, citing the Chase case, held the two trusts taxable. The
other five, where the power of revocation could only be exercised
with the consent of the beneficiaries, were held not taxable.
The Court, however, logically carried out the full implications
of its language in the Chase case,3 4 in Corliss v. Bowers,35 decided
in 193o, and held that under the income clause of the Federal Acts,
in a revocable trust with income to a wife for life and remainder
to the children, the settlor must pay the income tax himself, since
the wife's acquisition of the income becomes complete only when
the settlor fails to exercise the power that he has reserved.
In a recent U. S. District Court case,36 a reserved right to
change the trust and trustee and name other beneficiaries except
the settlor was held to make the corIus taxable. But if the re-
served power of appointment is only special and not general, no
tax is due, as only general powers of appointment come under the
language of the Federal Act.37 As might be expected, Dolan's
Estate is in direct opposition to a later case in the Circuit Court
of Appeals 38 for that circuit, where an unsuccessful effort was
made by the settlor's executors to recover the federal tax that had
been paid.
While these federal cases are apparently not in harmony with
some expressions as above cited in Jones v. Clifton, decided over
fifty years ago, it is to be remembered that a marriage settlement,
made by a man when solvent and later attacked by his creditors,
was involved in that case; the statements of law in it will be doubt-
less held only to apply to such type of case, and not to prevent a
subsequent federal statute from taxing these modern trusts when
they reserve the power of revocation.
Supra note 30.
28I U. S. 376, 50 Sup. Ct. 336 (193o).
Brady v. Ham, 38 F. (2d) 659 (D. Me. 193o). Also cf. Dean v. Willcuts,
32 F. (2d) 374 (Da Minn. 1929).
'Farmers L. & T. Co. v. Bowers, a9 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
Fidelity Trust Co. v. McCaughan, 34 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929).
Cf. as to irrevocable trusts the contrary decisions as to the identical trust deed
in People v. Northern Trust Co., supra note 28, and Comm'r of Int. Rev. v.
Northern Trust Co., infra note 49.
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Of course there is much to be said as to the practical wisdom
of reaching and taxing such trusts, since it is not strictly true, as
was said in Dolan's Estate and others following it, that the "right
to revoke unexercised . . . does not alter the character of the
. . estate granted" or "affect the grantee's power of enjoy-
ment". In fact the property right is made to depend on the wish
or even the whim and caprice of the settlor, and to that extent
vitiates the "enjoyment" of it, which the Reish case 39 gave as one
of the triple tests of absolute ownership. The word "enjoyment"
connotes not only "pleasure" but also "satisfaction", and the latter
element, which embodies a sense of security against the future, is
wanting in a gift that may at any time be recalled; the pres-
ence of such a "sword of Damocles" hanging over one's head
usually interferes with its unalloyed enjoyment. If the word
"enjoyment" means the income now in one's pocket or in one's
bank account, one's power of enjoyment of it is not marred by a
power of revocation resting in the background unexercised; but if
it means an assurance of one's future income from the same
source, this assurance is reduced to a more or less complete uncer-
tainty, and depends, perhaps, on whether one has a temperament
disposed to worry. The whimsicalities and capricious fancies and
illusions of the aged, as shown by many wills made or marriages
contracted when senility is approaching, furnish ample proof that
this constant dread of what may happen is by no means a ground-
less fear.
Again, the Dolan opinion loosely compares the right of revo-
cation to a power of appointment, of course when given by some
one else and not when reserved in the deed itself, and this resem-
blance was noted in some of the cases cited; but it is submitted
that the differences are greater than the resemblances. Such a
power is not over the donee's own property but over that of the
donor, the former being merely the conduit pipe to direct the flow
of the bounty of the donor of the power; the donee would not in
normal course secure the property covered by this kind of a power
to himself. On the other hand, a reserved power of revocation
in a deed gives the settlor the absolute right to repossess all the
'* Supra note 22.
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property himself as the sole owner at any time, although others
have temporarily the usufruct and management of it.
In point of fact the expression in the Reish case, "possession,
title and enjoyment in the grantor's lifetime", was only intended,
if we take its own facts, to apply to estates which had no power of
revocation attached. In that case a man five days before his death
conveyed all his property to his brother and took back a bond that
he should be given one-half of the net income from the real estate,
all the income from the personal property, and should have the free
use of his house for the rest of his life. It was held that this
transfer was liable to a collateral inheritance tax. Is not this
quotation being stretched beyond its reasonable limits when ap-
plied, in Dolan's Estate, forty years later, to very changed condi-
tions of modern life and business?
The average man who has made his own money has a natural
reluctance to part with it, partly because he believes he can increase
it for his ultimate beneficiaries far faster than any chosen trustee
can do in his place, but chiefly because of the consciousness of
power that it gives him. Now, if he can retain that power by
always keeping in his hand the string that will pull the property
back into his own exclusive control by a "mere stroke of the pen",
it is a tremendous leverage in inducing him to hand over part of
his hard-earned fortune to other hands, because he (the settlor)
may still retain the consciousness of his power over the actions of
his beneficiary. Hence the popularity of the revocable trust, which
outstrips the irrevocable kind many times in number and amount.
and in so far as the property in it is confined to life insurance poli -
cies, as is very often exclusively the case, it would seem in Penn-
sylvania not only exempt from any possible tax under our various
statutes (if the policies are payable to the classes of beneficiaries
named in the Acts of Assembly), but secure from the claims of
creditors as well.
40
The New York legislature, feeling that its state courts could
not be expected to change their rulings, passed a statute in 1922
which taxed all revocable gifts, whether this power to revoke, alter
"Act of April I5, 1868, P. L. lO3. Act of May 3, 1917, P. L. 112. Act of
May 17, 1919, P, L. 2o7. Irving Bank v. Alexander, 28o Pa. 466, 124 Atl. 6 34
(924).
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or amend can be exercised solely or in conjunction with others.
In the vernacular of the average legislator, "he who can shake the
plum-tree and during all his life keep those now enjoying its fruit
in apprehension lest he diminish their present pleasure or deprive
them of it entirely, should ultimately pay a tax in some form for
the privilege he has reserved to himself". The act is obviously
not retroactive, and so far as is known only the lower courts have
thus far construed it.
Revocable deeds of trust are generally not recorded, and the
executor or administrator of the estate of a deceased settlor, if
different from the trustee under his deed of trust, might very
likely in entire good faith never learn of the deeds of trust that
had been executed, and therefore would make no return of them
to either federal or state taxing authorities; yet the principle
embodied in the New York law of 1922 above referred to is likely
to be followed and its language enacted in other jurisdictions,
since the states will undoubtedly try to reach property, other than
insurance policies, transferred under revocable deeds of trust;
which run into large sums each year and remove from the reach
of the state taxing authorities the very large amounts in cash and
securities that they cover.
C. THE TRUSTS IRREVOCABLE AND THE SETTLOR RESERVING
ALL THE INCOME FOR LIFE
Here again we note the diverging opinions between the fed-
eral courts and those of most of the states as to the liability for
transfer inheritance tax. The state courts generally hold the
test of such taxability to be whether the settlor himself receives the
income; in this event, it naturally makes no difference whether the
trust is revocable or irrevocable, except that if irrevocable the date
of transfer should determine the amount of the tax, and not the
date of death. These principles are illustrated in Pennsylvania by
Houston's Estate.42 Here an irrevocable deed of trust had been
executed in 1918, the income being paid to the settlor during her
" Schweinert's Est., 133 Misc. 762, 234 N. Y. Supp. 307 (1929) ; Feust-
man's Est., 24o N. Y. Supp. 403 (1929).
1:276 Pa. 330, i2o AtI. 267 (923), aff'g 2 D. & C. 334 (Pa. x923).
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life, with remainder over. The settlor died in 1921. The re-
maindermen were collaterals, and between the date of execution
and the date of the death of the settlor, the collateral transfer tax
had been raised from 5% to xo%. The question was whether
this Act of Assembly raised the tax on the remainder. The Court
held that under the Act the tax was on the transfer of the title, that
the grantor in the deed had parted with her title before the Act
raised the rate, that she had neither the right of revocation nor
the right of control, and that accordingly the tax should be paid
under the old Act which was in force when the transfer of title
passed.
43
Other cases illustrating the principle that an irrevocable trust
can be taxed as an inheritance transfer if the settlor has received
the income during his life, can be found in Illinois,
44 Montana,45
New Jersey,40 New York 
47 and Wisconsin. 4s
The federal courts, however, hold that if the deed is irrevo-
cable it makes no difference if the settlor reserves all the income
to himself. 4' So, such a trust, created by Mrs. Van Schaick in
Illinois, was held not subject to the federal tax after being held
subject to taxation in the state; this is just the reverse of the two
cases involving Dolan's Estate, which was subject to a federal tax
but exempt in Pennsylvania.
One set of jurisdictions stresses the human desire to maintain
one's own personal income as large as possible. The other looks
at the equally human desire to preserve ultimate power over one's
principal as long as possible. With some men the first element is
the strongest and with others the second-even in the sane man
'See also Hieskellrs Est, 4 D. & C. 592 (1924).
"People v. Shaffer, 291 Ill. 142, 125 N. E. 887 (1919); also People v.
Northern Trust Co., supra note 28.
" Schuh's Est., 66 Mont. 50, 212 Pac. 516 (1923).
" Congregational Home Miss. Soc. v. Bugbee, ioi N. J. L. 214, 127 Atl. 192
(1925) ; Harvey's Est, 129 Atl. 393 (N. J. 1924) ; Farmers Tr. Co. v. Bugbee,
141 AtI. 579 (N. J. 1928) ; Russell's Est., 146 Atl. 361 (N. J. 1929).
' Egerton's Est., 1O3 Miso. 471, 17o N. Y. Supp. = (1918) ; Winter's Est.,
135 Misc. 258, 237 N. Y. Supp. ioi (I924).
Schrank's Est., 23o N. W. 691 (Wis. I93o).
May v. Heiner, 28i U. S. 238, 50 Sup. Ct. 286 (1929); McCaughn v.
Caruhill's Exec'r, 43 F. (2d) 69 (C. C. A. 3d, I93O) ; Comnm'r of Int. Rev. v.
Northern Trust Co., 41 F. (2d) 732 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930); Boyd v. United
States, 34 F. (2d) 488 (D. Conn. 1929). But cf. contra Comm'r v. Morsman
(C. C. A. 8th) decided Nov. IO, I93O, and not yet officially reported.
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at different stages of his health or maturity one element or the
other may predominate. Both instincts are deeply rooted in our
human nature, and logically there is little to choose between them.
We can appreciate the almost genial manner in which Judge Mor-
ton of the United States District Court of Massachusetts disposed
of the differences in interpretation in deciding a case involving a
general power of appointment under another clause of the Federal
Act. After admitting that the logic of his state decisions was
inescapable, he said, "It was a practical question and Congress had
the right to deal with it in a practical way . . . Congress was
not absolutely restricted to the legalism of the State courts." "
Likewise the federal courts have the right to be equally practical
in singling out, as the test for taxation, the element of revocability.
D. THE TRUST IRREVOCABLE WITH THE INCOME PAYABLE TO
OTHERS FOR THEIR LIVES
These classes of trusts are believed to be free of tax in all
jurisdictions, since the Federal Gift Tax was repealed in 1926. "
Illustrative decisions are cited below.
52
On the other hand, if the principal reverts as a vested remain-
der to the grantor's estate, it is taxable in New York;53 but if
this remainder is only contingent, it is apparently not taxable either
in Pennsylvania 54 or in New York;55 although seemingly subject
to federal tax."
A mere postponement of the vesting of the title in the bene-
ficiary of a trust agreement until a specified period after death does
not destroy irrevocability. 7
Stratton v. United States, 42 F. (2d) 779 (D. Mass. 193o).
m44 STAT. 125 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § iog1, n. (1928).
Reineke v. Trust Co., supra note 31 ; Hirsh v. United States, 35 F. (2d)
982 (Ct. of CI. 1929) ; Williams v. United States, 41 F. (2d) 895 (Ct. of Cl.
192o) ; Bronzynski's Est., supra note 8; Cochrane's Est., supra note 27, as to
the Getty Trust; Allan v. Hendrick, IO4 Ore. 2o2, 206 Pac. 733 (1922).
' Cochrane's Est., N. Y., supra note 27, as to 5 of the trusts.
" Arrison's Est., 8 D. & C. 494 (1926).
' Schweinert's Est., supra note 41. The federal rule is not yet entirely clear.
Comm'r v. McCormick, infra note 56; cf. May v. Heiner, supra note 49.
Comm'r v. McCormick, 43 F. (2d) 277 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930), decided Sept.
20, 193o, and not yet officially reported.
"' Shukert v. Allen, 273 U. S. 545, 47 Sup. Ct. 461 (1927) ; Hodgkins Exrs.
v. Comm'r (C. C. A. 7th), decided Oct. 16, 193o, and not yet officially reported;
People v. No. Trust Co., supra note 38.
DIFFERING INT5RPRETATIONS APPLIED TO TRUSTS ig9
This federal rule of construction opens a large field for men
of wealth to get all the income in their estates for their lives and
yet ultimately pay no inheritance taxes to the Federal Government.
It is of course now only applicable to estates over $ioo,ooo. But
it involves the paying as a price the inability to change any of the
beneficiaries of the trust,58 and also depriving oneself of the pleas-
ure of ever getting one's principal back. To what extent men of
wealth are willing to do this could only be accurately known after
the laws have been in operation a long time and after one has
accurate figures for the whole country, showing the total amounts
held in both revocable and irrevocable trusts by the trust com-
panies.
Moreover the federal tax exemption does not seem incompat-
ible with a settlor retaining some very real rights over the res of
the trust estate. Thus in the Reineke case '9 the settlor reserved
the power to supervise investments, to vote stock, to have proxies
made to his nominee, to control all leases made and to appoint a
successor trustee; and in a recent case in the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania it was held that a mere direction that premiums on
insurance policies payable to a trustee should be paid out of the
income from an irrevocable trust and that the settlor should be con-
sulted on investments; did not constitute "enjoyment" in the settlor
so as to make the transfer subject to tax under the Pennsylvania
statute.60 So, if an irrevocable trust can only be changed with the
consent of the trustee, it will not destroy its irrevocability if it is
so changed, so as to make it liable to the federal tax, since the
trustee of course is responsible to the parties in remainder, and, as
said in Erskine v. White,6 "the trustee is not a rubber stamp".
Now, if a deed is revocable for a fixed period and then be-
comes irrevocable, what will happen as to the federal tax? It has
'Bank of New York, Admr. v. Com'r., Board of Tax Appeals, No. 32,881,
opinion Sept. 8, i93o, not yet officially reported.
I Supra note 31.
0o Logan's Est., opinion July io, i93o, 14 Adv. Super. Unofl. 532.
'U. S. D. C. Mass., opinion Oct. 12, i93o, not yet officially reported; also
Farmers L. & T. Co. v. Bowers, Com'r., supra note 37; also Bowers' Est.,
supra note 29. But compare these with the Saltonstall case, supra note 7, where
the right to revoke could only be exercised with the consent of the trustee. and
with the recent case of Comm'r v. McCormick, supra note 56.
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been held that the tax becomes payable when it passes from one
class to the other, by act of the parties.
6 2
So, in conclusion, we can only reiterate that in trusts inter
vivos the real basis of liability for state inheritance transfer taxa-
tion is "who gets the income?" and in the federal courts the key-
note question is whether the trust is revocable, with as many cases
close to the dividing line as the ingenuity of counsel and the con-
stant desires of settlors to avoid inheritance or transfer taxes sug-
gest new plans of settlement. If a homely phrase may here be
pardoned, everyone wants "both his penny and his cake" if he can
get them, and the varying questions that arise under different in-
terpretations by the federal and state courts of identical statutory
language in their respective jurisdictions absorb much of the time
and add greatly to the professional emoluments of many eminent
members of the American bar.
' Means v. U. S. (Ct. of Cl.) H-366, opinion filed Apr. 7, i93o, and not yet
officially reported, but certiorari denied by U. S. Supreme Ct. Oct. 13, 1930.
